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ABSTRACT
Humans have been shown to falsely remember seeing the details just beyond the edges of
a pictured scene. This constructive memory error is known as boundary extension. Either the
traditional visual-cognitive model or the multisource model, which differ in their distinction
between scene perception and representation, can explain boundary extension. Five experiments
assessed boundary extension in humans (Homo sapiens), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) using identical and equivalent delayed match-to-sample tasks.
The present study replicated boundary extension in human adults. However, neither monkey
species demonstrated boundary extension when viewing human-unique or monkey-relevant
scenes. Unlike humans, monkeys may not have demonstrated boundary extension because they
are local visual processors. This would have limited their view of the stimuli as scenes, allowing
them to rely on direct visual input. This species discontinuity reflects the potentially humanunique qualities of boundary extension.

INDEX WORDS: Boundary extension, Scene perception, Multisource model, Rhesus monkeys,
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1

INTRODUCTION

Human vision is graded in nature, with visual acuity decreasing dramatically outside of
the foveal region in the center of the visual field. As a result, accurate scene perception requires
shifts in eye movement to reposition the fovea approximately three to four times per second
(Rayner, 2009). In addition, whenever the eyes are moving (known as a saccade), vision is
suppressed (known as saccadic suppression; Matin, 1974). However, despite these limitations,
humans perceive a comprehensible and continuous world. The question of how this is achieved
has long intrigued vision and cognition researchers (e.g., Davidoff, 1975; Gibson, 1950; Gordon,
2004; Hering, 1868/1977), including those who study perception across species and are
interested in understanding the evolutionary foundations of human visual perception (Lazareva,
Shimizu, & Wasserman, 2012).
Scene perception research has repeatedly demonstrated that humans are able to
meaningfully perceive the surrounding world very quickly. In as little as one eye fixation,
observers can identify complex views (e.g., drawings or photographs) by general categories (e.g.,
‘ocean scene’) or words (e.g., Biederman, 1972; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982;
Potter, 1976), as well as describe them (Intraub, 1981). The specific time frame for scene
classification has been identified to be within about 100 ms of picture onset (Davenport & Potter,
2004; Fei-Fei, Iyer, Koch, & Perona, 2007; Intraub, 1981; Potter, 1976; Vo͂ & Henderson, 2010).
Data from event-related potentials during a categorization task with rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) of the photographs indicated identification of the scenes’ category occurred
150 ms after initial picture exposure (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996), providing additional
evidence of the rapidity of scene identification.
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Nonhuman primates also quickly and accurately categorize objects (Vogels, 2012).
Research with rhesus macaques has shown that they are able to distinguish stimuli from different
categories and transfer their learning to categorization of new stimuli, which is evidence of
concept formation for the categories (e.g., animals vs. non-animals and food vs. non-food, FabreThorpe, Richard, & Thorpe, 1998; trees vs. non-trees and fish vs. non-fish, Vogels, 1999;
monkeys vs. non-monkeys, Yoshikubo, 1985). For example, using a rapid visual categorization
task, Fabre-Thorpe et al. (1998) trained two rhesus macaques to discriminate photographs based
on visual concepts, classifying food vs. non-food or animal vs. non-animal. Once the task was
learned, monkeys demonstrated categorization of 200 novel images with high accuracy (90.5%
for foods and 84% for animals). Their performance was compared to performance of humans
tested with the same new stimuli and similar errors were made across species, suggesting similar
categorization strategies. As in human categorization, monkeys performed these categorizations
within one eye fixation (the target image was flashed for only 80 ms) and very quickly, on
average between 250 and 350 ms. Monkeys’ ability to categorize stimuli that they had never seen
suggests they developed a mental representation of the target category as a concept. Other
species of monkeys and animals also can discriminate between stimuli of different categories and
apply mental schemas for these concepts to new stimuli (e.g., capuchin monkeys, D’Amato &
Van Sant, 1988; squirrel monkeys, Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988; stump-tailed monkeys, Schrier,
Angarella, & Povas, 1984; see Zentall, Wasserman, Lazareva, Thompson, & Rattermann, 2008,
for a review).
Abstract stimuli also can be categorized into explicit and implicit categories by capuchin
monkeys (e.g., Smith et al., 2012b) and rhesus macaques (e.g., Smith, Beran, Crossley, Boomer,
& Ashby, 2010). Rhesus macaques, along with humans, can generalize knowledge of these
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abstract categories to novel stimuli (e.g., Smith et al., 2015; Zakrzewski, Church, & Smith,
2018). The results of these studies highlight the abstract mental representations that can be
learned by nonhuman primates (Vogels, 1999). These mental concepts that developed to
organize and interpret the presented stimuli into categories are evidence of schemas in nonhuman
cognition.
Human recognition memory for rapidly identified pictures (presented in the absence of
any masks) is generally poor (e.g., Intraub, 1981; Potter, 1976). However, if attention is shifted
to some pictures of an RSVP sequence and not others (Intraub, 1984) or to a primary task (Lin,
Pype, Murray, & Boynton, 2010) then memory improves for some of the briefly presented
pictures in the sequence. Recognition memory for these pictures, however, does not last for long,
with even a 1.4 second delay to an immediate recognition test having resulted in a decline in
memory performance for a set of five pictures (Potter, Staub, Rado, & O’Connor, 2002). Thus,
while visual perception and processing is complex and swift, the information that is perceived is
quickly vulnerable to retrieval error.
1.1

Memory Errors

1.1.1 Errors of Omission
In addition to studies of picture recognition memory, memory researchers have also
studied humans’ ability to remember a picture’s details. Errors in memory for picture details
typically occur for long-term memory. However, change blindness (the failure to detect visual
changes to an object or scene across brief interruptions; Simons & Levin, 1997; Simons &
Rensink, 2005) highlights the fragility of detail retention even for extremely brief retention
intervals. Using the flicker paradigm, Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997) repeatedly presented
alternating photographs of a real-world scene and a modified version of that scene to participants
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for 240 ms each. Between the photographs, a blank screen was presented for 80 ms, creating a
flickering appearance to mimic eye movements without requiring a change in fixation location
(Simons & Levin, 1997). Under these conditions, observers struggled to identify the single
change that had been made to the scene, even after repeated presentation. For some images,
nearly a minute of alternations was required by observers for them to detect what had changed in
the image. However, with the blank screen removed, changes were detected in less than one
second on average. Similarly, a verbal cue of the change prior to stimuli presentation also
produced significant improvement in observers’ change detection.
This error of omission brought into question how much detail is retained between eye
movements in visual memory representations. Rensink (2000; Rensink et al., 1997) proposed
that without focused attention visual change was not perceived because observers do not
maintain detailed visual scene representations in short-term memory that can be used to make
comparisons across saccades and other similarly brief time intervals. However, visual memory
theory (Hollingworth, 2006; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002) provides an alternative
explanation that identifies limits in attention, not representation detail, as the reason for change
blindness. Other researchers (e.g., Hochberg, 1986, as cited in Intraub, Gottesman, Willey, &
Zuk, 1996; O’Regan, 1992; Simons & Levin, 1997) have also argued that internal visual
representations may lack much detail. In addition, research demonstrating the large capacity of
human recognition memory (e.g., more than 2,000 photographs; Standing, Conezio, & Haber,
1970) also makes evident that this memory was not reliant on the precise visual details of the
images. Stimuli were mirror-reversed at test without significant detriment to observers’
recognition performance.
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On the other hand, some studies (e.g., Intraub, 1980; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva,
2010) have provided evidence of accurate memory for specific visual details under difficult
conditions, suggesting that details are normally retained in scene representations. For example,
Intraub (1980) demonstrated that photographs presented briefly (110 ms) using an RSVP
paradigm with varied inter-stimulus intervals (4,890 ms; 1,390 ms; 620 ms; 385 ms; 0 ms) could
elicit recognition memory for photos’ visuospatial orientation (assessed with reversal detection)
at proportions better than chance when the inter-stimulus interval was at least 1,390 ms. More
recently, observers have been shown to distinguish previously seen images and novel images
from the same scene category in a recognition memory test, even after having studied categories
with up to 64 other exemplar scenes and with approximately 3,000 images and 130 scene
categories in memory at test – evidence that a sufficient amount of detail in addition to scene
category is retained during scene perception (Konkle et al., 2010). This contradictory evidence
makes it unclear just how much detail is held in visual scene representations during perception at
different stages.
1.1.2 Errors of Commission
When thinking of failures in memory, errors of omission often first come to mind.
However, errors of commission also are seen, in which details, words, or events that were never
experienced are falsely remembered as having occurred. For example, false memories can be
induced during list learning, resulting in participants “remembering” words that were never
presented to them. Roediger and McDermott (1995) presented participants with lists of words to
be studied, where each list had several words closely associated to a critical, non-presented word
(e.g., “sleep” was a critical non-presented word for a list that included “bed,” “rest,” and
“awake”). During the following free recall and recognition memory tests, this non-presented
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word was frequently falsely included as having been on the list, and often was reported with high
confidence. Similarly, short sentences can elicit false memories for the compound sentences that
are created if they were to be combined, despite these longer sentences not having been
presented (Bransford & Franks, 1971). Items not included in photographs of stereotypical scenes
are also later falsely recognized (Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998) – evidence that false memories
related to schematic knowledge can be created as well.
In addition to word and sentence associations, schemas can lead to commission errors in
human memory. Schemas are a set of organized expectations, forming mental concepts of
objects and events, that are involved in information processing, storage, and retrieval (Lewis &
Durrant, 2011; Taylor & Crocker, 1981, as cited in Tuckey & Brewer, 2003; Tuckey & Brewer,
2003) and have implications for eyewitness memory of events, story recall, deductive inferences,
and education (Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998; Tse et al., 2007; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003).
These “frameworks” for knowledge (Tse et al., 2007) develop from abstractions of newly
encoded information (Kumaran, Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2009; Lewis & Durrant,
2011) that explain the relations between similar objects or events (e.g. chihuahuas and Great
Danes are both dogs, with “dogs” being the mental schema in this example; Kumaran et al.,
2009). As new information is learned it is integrated into schemas (Dumay & Gaskell, 2007;
Loftus, 1996; Tamminen, Payne, Stickgold, Wamsley, & Gaskell, 2010), especially when it is
compatible with an already existing schema (Kumaran et al., 2009; Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Tse
et al., 2007). Schemas can even be learned for abstract dot-patterns made from variations of
prototypes (e.g., Posner & Keels, 1970). During integration, the details of a memory can
sometimes be distorted to fit the existing schema (Lewis & Durrant, 2011), resulting in false
memories. For example, Tuckey and Brewer (2003) presented witnesses with ambiguous
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information. Witnesses interpreted this information using their schemas, resulting in schemaconsistent false memories and reduced accuracy as a result of the underlying schema supporting
the “true” events (Loftus, 1996). During a recognition task of ambiguous shapes with or without
disambiguating labels, older adults (60 to 75 years old) especially showed more false recognition
of related lures when semantic schemas were activated by the presence of labels (Koustaal et al.,
2003). In addition, some of the categories studied had larger numbers of exemplars than others,
resulting in higher rates of false recognition, presumably because of the more salient perceptual
or conceptual schema for the items elicited during the study phase compared to categories for
which only one item was presented. In the same study, older adults also showed higher false
recognition of concrete objects (e.g., bed, candle) than abstract objects (e.g., pictures of abstract
art), further demonstrating the role of schemas and conceptual representations in false memories.
Schacter, Verfaellie, and Anes (1997) reported a distinction between conceptual false recognition
and perceptual false recognition. Participants were presented with conceptually and perceptually
related words (e.g., funnel and twister, related to the conceptual lure “tornado,” and hate and late,
related to the perceptual lure “fate”). False recognition was seen more for conceptually related
words than perceptually related words, and with higher levels of confidence. Similarly, older
adults (63 to 75 years old) have shown a tendency to rely on conceptual and/or perceptual
similarity when tested on a recognition memory test for colored pictures (Koustaal & Schacter,
1997). This reliance on the similarity of studied pictures impacted adults’ recognition of the
unrelated items that they had previously studied. Like Koustaal et al. (2003), Koutstaal and
Schacter (1997) also reported an effect of category size on false recognition, where falsely
recognized lures were more frequent for larger categories. Constructive memory errors in picture
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memory, however, would not be expected under simple conditions, but research on boundary
extension has demonstrated otherwise.
1.2

Boundary Extension
In studies of boundary extension (e.g., Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992; Intraub &

Richardson, 1989), participants are presented with a target image, typically a photograph or
drawing of a scene (i.e., one or more objects placed within a larger, continuous spatial
background), and they usually remember seeing parts of the image just beyond the edges of the
pictured scene that were not originally visible. Participants’ memory of the scenes is typically
assessed by having them draw the target image from memory or rate whether a second
photograph or drawing of the same scene (which is presented with either the same or a different
viewpoint as the target image) has a closer viewpoint, the same viewpoint, or a more wide-angle
viewpoint than the original image. When reporting on their memory for the viewed scenes,
participants often draw the images with information that likely would have been present if the
original boundaries of the scene had been extended outward slightly (e.g., more grass around an
object on the lawn or the continuation of fencing in the background; see Figure 1.1). Similarly,
when rating probe photographs or drawings, observers usually rate images with a more wideangle view (i.e., a more “zoomed out” viewpoint) as being the same as the original image more
often than they do for more close-up (“zoomed in”) views. Together, these responses indicate
that participants falsely remember seeing the target image with more information than was
presented. The information just outside the boundaries of the actual view was incorporated into
their memory for the scene, distorting the location of the view’s boundaries.
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Figure 1.1 Examples of boundary extension.
The top row depicts close-up target images viewed by participants, with the participants’
drawings from memory of those same scenes below. Boundary extension is seen in the drawings
by the continuation of each scene at each edge compared to the close-up images. Images in the
left column are from “Wide-Angle Memories of Close-Up Scenes,” by H. Intraub and M.
Richardson, 1989, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15,
p. 182. Images in the right column are from “Boundary Extension for Briefly Glimpsed
Photographs: Do Common Perceptual Processes Result in Unexpected Memory Distortions?”
by H. Intraub, C. V. Gottesman, E. V. Willey, and I.J. Zuk, 1996, Journal of Memory and
Language, 35, p. 124.
Since the first formal test of boundary extension (Intraub & Richardson, 1989),
subsequent studies have revealed a specific diagnostic pattern indicative of the phenomenon
(e.g., Hubbard, Hutchison, & Courtney, 2010; Intraub, 2010; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008). When
no change is made between the target and probe images for an originally close-up view,
participants usually rate the probe image as more close-up than the target image. The target
image is remembered with extended boundaries, and as a result the close-up view is thought to
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show less of the original image. However, when no change is made from a wide-angle view there
is little or no directional error seen in participants’ ratings. When the target and test pictures do
not match in viewpoint (i.e., truly showing less or more of the scene in the test picture) a
distractor image rating asymmetry is seen. When less of the scene is shown in the test picture
(i.e., a wide-angle target is followed by a close-up probe), the difference between the images is
easily detected as being more close-up in view. However, when more of the image is shown in
the test picture (i.e., a close-up target is followed by a wide-angle probe), the images are more
often thought to be the same or rated as more similar. As a result, a smaller range of differences
in the rating of test images is seen for this trial type than when less of a scene is shown at test.
The typical response pattern (that boundary extension is larger for close-up views than
wide-angle views) is also seen when a medium-angle view is included in the stimulus set, with
boundary extension for the medium-angle view dependent on whether it is the more close-up or
wide-angle view relative to the other picture(s) (Intraub et al., 1992). When presented with a
more close-up view, boundary extension was not seen for the medium-angle view, but when the
medium-angle view was presented with a more wide-angle view, the medium-angle view led to
boundary extension, while the wide-angle view did not. When all three views were presented
together, after a 48-hour retention interval, only the close-up and medium-angle views resulted in
boundary extension, with accurate memory reported for wide-angle views. In the original test of
boundary extension, Intraub and Richardson (1989) used a large number of pictures, ample
stimulus presentation time, and rather long retention intervals. However, boundary extension has
since been demonstrated under a variety of conditions not expected to generate false memories.
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1.2.1 Previous Research of Boundary Extension
Even in the absence of large stimulus sets, boundary extension has been demonstrated.
Several studies have shown evidence of boundary extension despite low memory loads of only
one to three pictures presented per trial (e.g., Bertamini, Jones, Spooner, & Hecht, 2005;
Dickinson & Intraub, 2008; Intraub et al., 1996; Intraub, Daniels, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2008;
Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub, Hoffman, Wetherhold, & Stoehs, 2006; Kreindel & Intraub,
2017; Seamon, Schlegel, Hiester, Landau, & Blumenthal, 2002). Most interesting in relation to
the present study is the occurrence of boundary extension even when only one target image was
presented at a time, and participants commented on their memory for the item immediately after
its presentation and before the next target image (e.g., Beighley & Intraub, 2016; Intraub et al.,
2006, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Kreindel & Intraub, 2017; Seamon et al., 2002).
Explicit instructions to pay close attention to the test images’ background and main
objects or its boundaries also do not eliminate the presence of boundary extension from memory
(e.g., Gagnier, Dickinson, & Intraub, 2013; Intraub & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub & Richardson,
1989). Intraub and Bodamer (1993), for example, informed some participants of the nature of the
drawing and rating tasks prior to viewing the target images (test-informed condition), as well as
demonstrated the boundary extension effect to other participants and instructed them to avoid the
memory error during study and later memory reports (demo condition). However, when
compared to the control condition (standard task instructions), boundary extension was observed
across all conditions for both tasks. Although participants in the test-informed and demo
conditions displayed reduced boundary extension during the drawing task, as well as reduction
during the rating task only for the test-informed condition, levels of boundary extension in both
groups across tasks were still significantly different from control conditions. Gagnier et al.
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(2013) also found a reduction, but not elimination, of boundary extension during boundary rating
and border adjustment tasks for test-informed participants.
Boundary extension also has been demonstrated in humans across the lifespan. Recently,
Kreindel and Intraub (2017) have reported observations of boundary extension in preschool
children (4 to 5 years old) and adults (18 to 21 years old) using a drawing and forced-choice
immediate recognition memory task. Seamon et al. (2002) observed boundary extension in
young children (5 to 7 years old), adolescents (10 to 12 years old), young adults (18 to 21 years
old), and older adults (58 to 84 years old) using a drawing task and single picture stimulus
presentations. Similarly, Chapman, Ropar, Mitchell, and Ackroyd (2005) reported boundary
extension during a magnification adjustment task (in which probe images were zoomed in or out
by the participant to match their remembered view of the target image) in adolescent males 9 to
16 years old with Asperger’s syndrome, an age- and intelligence-matched control group, and a
control group of adult male and female participants (18 to 53 years old). Candel, Merckelbach,
Houben, and Vandyck (2004) also have provided evidence of boundary extension in children
(10-12 years old) during the standard drawing task. Spanò, Intraub, and Edgin (2017) reported
boundary extension in preschoolers (4 to 7 years old), adolescents (13 to 17 years old), and
participants with Down’s Syndrome (11 to 25 years old) across three different tasks (drawing,
recognition, and 3D scene reconstruction tasks), demonstrating this memory error across stages
of development and impairment in memory. Claims of boundary extension in infants (3 to 4
months old and 6 to 7 months old) have even been made (Quinn & Intraub, 2007), using
preferential looking procedures. After familiarization to a target picture, infants were
simultaneously presented with wide-angle and close-up views of the same scene and were found
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to look at the close-up views during test trials at rates significantly above chance (taken to
indicate that the wide-angle view was considered more familiar).
Additionally, a wide range of retention intervals, from days to milliseconds, have been
found to elicit boundary extension. In a recognition test after 6 to 13 days of retention, Safer,
Christianson, Autry, and Österlund (1998) found strong evidence for boundary extension of a
neutral image. Intraub et al. (1992), Intraub and Berkowits (1996), and Intraub and Richardson
(1989) all found boundary extension in participants’ memory after a 48-hr retention interval.
Intraub et al. (1992, 1996) reported boundary extension within minutes of participants viewing
multiple pictures. Boundary extension also has been reported after 1 s (e.g., Bertamini et al.,
2005; Dickinson & Intraub, 2008; Intraub et al., 1996) and 2.5 s (e.g., Dickinson & Intraub,
2009) retention intervals. Shortening retention intervals even further, Dickinson and Intraub
(2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008) also obtained boundary extension with 42-, 100-, 250-, and
625-ms retention intervals. These shorter retention intervals clearly indicate that boundary
extension is independent of long-term memory processes. In one of the fastest examples of
boundary extension to date, photographs were interrupted by a mask for only 42 ms before
reappearing to be rated (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008). For identical close-up views, for example,
this extremely brief break in visual input was enough for observers to falsely remember the
target view with more of the scene than was presented and rate the identical probe image as
having a more close-up view than before. Intraub and Dickinson’s (2008) finding that boundary
extension occurs across such a brief retention interval is significant because 42 ms is also the
duration of a saccade. A retention interval quicker than an eye blink suggests that observers may
be extending their scene representations as their eyes rapidly move between fixation points. This
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would mean that during saccadic suppression, when vision is suppressed as the eyes are moving,
may be when boundary extension occurs.
Boundary extension also has been observed with a wide range of target durations.
Presentation times ranging from less than one second per picture (133 ms – Beighley & Intraub,
2016; 250-750 ms – e.g., Beighley & Intraub, 2016; Bertamini et al., 2005; Dickinson & Intraub,
2008, 2009; Intraub et al., 1996, 2006, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Munger, Owens, &
Conway, 2005) to three to five seconds per picture (e.g., Chapman et al., 2005; DeLucia &
Maldia, 2006; Intraub et al., 1996, 2006) have all resulted in boundary extension effects in
memory. Even longer presentation times that allow for ample studying of the test pictures and
should protect against memory errors (e.g. 15 seconds: Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et
al., 1992; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998; Kreindel & Intraub, 2017) still result in boundary
extension.
Additionally, boundary extension has been observed for scenes within scenes (i.e., a
smaller picture within a larger one; Gottesman & Intraub, 2003) and regardless of whether the
scenes were viewed inverted or upright (Beighley & Intraub, 2016; Intraub & Berkowits, 1996).
This memory error also has been repeatedly demonstrated across different response measures
and modalities (e.g., haptic studying of a 3D scene and 3D scene reconstruction), and to be
unrelated to whether the objects within the original scene were cropped by the view’s boundaries
(e.g., Chapman et al., 2005; Gagnier et al., 2013; Gottesman & Intraub, 2003; Intraub et al.,
1992; Intraub, 2004; Intraub & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Spanό et al., 2017).
However, the presented stimuli must be of a continuous view that in the real-world would extend
beyond the presented picture’s edges (including simple textured backgrounds, such as concrete
pavement; although see Blazhenkova, 2017, for evidence of boundary extension in recognition
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memory of faces). Non-scenes or single objects not a part of any larger surrounding context (e.g.,
on a blank background) do not produce boundary extension (Hubbard et al., 2010), evidence that
this error is not simply one of misrepresenting the size of a focal object. Intraub et al. (1998)
presented participants with line drawings of scenes and line drawings of the same scenes’ central
objects on a blank background. Both a rating task and drawing task produced boundary extension
for the line drawings of the scenes, but not the line drawings of the objects. When participants
were instructed to envision a described scene around the line drawings of the objects, however,
boundary extension for the images was observed (Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al.,
1998). Similar results of boundary extension for photographs but not “background-less
drawings,” were also found by Legault and Standing (1992). However, Munger and Multhaup
(2016) found no additive effects of imagining additional details about a scene (e.g., smells,
sounds, scene surroundings) for boundary extension.
Mamus and Boduroglu (2018) compared boundary extension of scenes presented with
semantically consistent objects, semantically inconsistent objects, and objects without a
background. They found that semantically consistent scenes produced the most boundary
extension. Whereas objects presented without a background also produced boundary extension,
they argued that this was because the real objects elicit a pretense of a background scene (similar
to the results of envisioned scenes by Gottesman & Intraub, 2002). In a second experiment,
pictures of abstract shapes, for which scene schemas were completely removed, resulted in no
boundary extension, which Mamus and Boduroglu claimed further suggests the necessity of
schemas in boundary extension. While Mamus and Boduroglu found that contextual consistency
is not necessary for boundary extension to occur, it should be noted that Bertamini et al. (2005)
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did not observe boundary extension when scenes were presented with less clear details by
removing the context of the scene.
1.2.2 Role of Boundary Extension
Boundary extension may have an adaptive role in visual scene perception. Hypothesized
to facilitate the integration of successive views (e.g., Intraub, 1997, 2002), boundary extension
reflects anticipation of the upcoming scene during visual scanning to generate the coherent and
continuous view of the world that we perceive (Intraub, 2012; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008).
Scene perception may involve representations that prime future spatial processing of a scene as
they are integrated (e.g., Sanocki, 2003). Boundary extension may be evidence of this priming
for expected, “soon-to-be-visible” aspects of a scene in the next fixation (Intraub & Dickinson,
2008). Consistent with this idea are the findings of Ménétrier, Didierjean, and Barbe (2018) that
showed reduced boundary extension when participants had knowledge of a picture’s larger
spatial context. Participants studied a very wide view of test images before completing a rating
recognition task with closer views of the same scenes. This study period induced contextual
knowledge for the images, reducing the need for boundary extension. Under some conditions
(high-confidence ratings), boundary extension was eliminated completely. Scene perception
processes are in less need of predictions from boundary extension when contextual spatial
knowledge of a scene is already known, highlighting the role of these predictions. While Intraub
and Dickinson (2008; Intraub, 2010) have proposed an alternative model of scene representation
to explain the mechanisms leading to boundary extension, the traditional visual-cognitive model
of scene perception must first be reviewed.
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1.3

The Traditional Visual-Cognitive Model
Human memory for scenes is not ‘picture perfect,’ and how imperfect scene

representations are created in human memory is unclear. This question has driven research by
many cognitive psychologists over the years, and several short-term memory buffers have been
identified that facilitate the integration of visual information into visual memories, presumably
also contributing to “mis-memories.”
During scene perception, information is first held in visual sensory memory, also called
iconic memory (Sperling, 1960). Visual sensory representations, however, quickly fade, and are
maintained for only approximately 300 ms in this short-term buffer. Loftus, Johnson, and
Shimamura (1985) found that representations for briefly presented, unmasked pictures are
maintained for approximately 100 ms after the visual stimulus is removed. If the presented visual
stimulus is masked (disrupting sensory memory), visual information can be stored in one of
several other short-term memory buffers: transsaccadic memory for the duration of an eye
movement (Irwin, 1991, 1993), visual short-term memory for a few seconds (Phillips, 1974),
conceptual short-term memory for the time between picture identification (approximately 100 ms
after stimulus presentation) and consolidation (Potter, 1976), or visual working memory across
ongoing tasks (the visuospatial sketchpad; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Information in these stores
can then either be consolidated in long-term memory or lost.
These different short-term memory systems should not necessarily be thought of as
discrete entities, but instead as different stages of visual information processing (Intraub, 2012).
For example, due to saccadic suppression as the eyes are moving, the visual-cognitive system
relies on transsaccadic memory across fixations. This means humans alternate between visual
sensory input and memory during initial formation of visual representations. In this model,
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conceptual knowledge is prompted by visual sensory information, but remains a separate type of
representation (Intraub, 2012). In other words, bottom-up processing of visual sensory input
results in the initial mental representations during scene perception. Top-down processing, as a
result of conceptual knowledge, then interacts with and alters these representations. Support for
this distinction can be found in Potter’s (1976) explanation for why recognition memory for
pictures presented with RSVP was poor. Potter (1976) identified conceptual masking within
conceptual short-term memory as the cause of poor recognition memory during RSVP tasks; an
effect distinct from visual masking experienced within iconic memory. Conceptual masking is
brought on by the conceptual processing of a subsequent picture that interrupts the conceptual
representation of a scene currently being maintained in conceptual short-term memory (resulting
in the forgetting of this previous representation). However, if processing and consolidation of the
initial conceptual representation into long-term memory occurs prior to this interruption, it is
protected from conceptual masking and remembered, even in the face of a visual mask. This
distinction between conceptual and visual masking, supported by other studies of memory for
briefly presented pictures as well (e.g., Intraub, 1980, 1984; Loftus & Ginn, 1984), suggests a
distinction between processes of perception and representation that is central to the traditional
visual-cognitive model.
While the visual stimuli are still present, an observer would readily discern the location
of a picture’s boundaries. Given this fact, it should be assumed that the extended representations
reported during tests of boundary extension are not constructed within the visual-cognitive model
until the viewed scene has been removed. Taking into consideration the rapidity of boundary
extension (e.g., Dickinson & Intraub, 2008; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008), the extrapolation of the
scene representation must be constructed not only after the view is gone but also completed
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before the observer’s next fixation. In other words, between saccades (Intraub & Dickinson,
2008). However, Intraub and Dickinson (2008; Intraub, 2010, 2012) have found this hard to
explain with the traditional visual-cognitive model. They have argued that a “scene extrapolation
buffer” (Intraub, 2010) would need to be added alongside the other short-term memory buffers in
the model or extrapolation capabilities added to transsaccadic or visual short-term memory.
Assuming these additions unlikely, they have proposed an alternative model of visual scene
processing to explain boundary extension – the multisource model (Intraub, 2010; Intraub &
Dickinson, 2008).
1.4

The Multisource Model of Scene Perception
Unlike the traditional visual-cognitive model, for which visual sensory input is the sole

basis of visual perception and the representation, in the multisource model scene perception
begins with an underlying spatial framework that is simultaneously filled in by information from
multiple sources (both internal and external; Intraub, 2010; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008).
According to this model, viewing a picture elicits several sources of input that are then organized
within an egocentric frame of reference and provide the observer with a mental representation of
the scene centered around their viewpoint (e.g., viewpoint of the camera when looking at a
photograph; Bryant, Tversky, & Franklin, 1992; Franklin & Tversky, 1990). This scene
representation is created from visual sensory input of the stimulus, amodal perception of objects
and surfaces (Kanizsa, 1979, as cited in Intraub, 2010; Yin, Kellman, & Shipley, 1997), and
conceptual knowledge associated with the view (scene categorization; e.g., Greene & Oliva,
2009; Tversky & Hemenway, 1983, and contextual associations made from objects within the
scene; e.g., Bar, 2004). In other words, information from sensory input and top-down processing
critical for view comprehension are combined together to form one’s conceptualization of the
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likely overall surrounding spatial context of the view. This compiled scene representation is
considered, in this model, to be scene perception. Intraub (2012) likens this multisource
representation to a “simulation” described by Barsalou (1999) in his theory of grounded
cognition (see Barsalou, 2010, for a review). In the multisource model, bottom-up and top-down
processing interact simultaneously to form even the initial mental representations of scene
perception, in contrast to the step-wise nature of the traditional visual-cognitive model.
The fundamental spatial structure of this model does not have to be egocentric in nature
(Intraub, 2010), and can take on different frames of reference depending on the viewpoint taken
by the observer (e.g., allocentric or geographic; see Allen, 2004, for a review of this topic).
Amodal perception is prompted by visual obstructions of the physical world and allows an
observer to infer the likely surroundings of a scene by completing cropped objects (Kanizsa,
1979) and surfaces (Yin et al., 1997). It is named as such because it does not employ any specific
sensory modalities (Kellman, Yin, & Shipley, 1998). In the multisource model of scene
perception, extrapolation of the visual input just beyond the edges of the view by amodal
perception is constrained by the visual details at the picture’s boundaries (Gottesman & Intraub,
2003) and the general categorization and associations of the scene from conceptual knowledge.
Because amodal perception and the observer’s associated conceptual knowledge of the view
contribute to scene perception even initially, boundary-extended regions are not constructed after
stimulus offset but instead are already present in the scene representation while the scene is
being viewed. This is a distinction from the traditional model (see Figure 1.2 for a pictorial
depiction of this difference). The error is, therefore, believed to occur from the observer
misreporting the source of this extended region as being externally generated (i.e., from visual
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input) instead of internally generated (i.e., amodal perception and conceptual knowledge) – a
source monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).

Figure 1.2 Boundary extension in the context of the traditional visual-cognitive model
(top) and the multisource model (bottom).
In both cases, the perception panels represent what occurs while the picture is available,
compared to when the stimulus is removed (memory panels). Relevant abstract concepts
associated with the scene representation are shown in verbal form for the visual-cognitive
model. Illustrations are from “Rethinking visual scene perception,” by H. Intraub, 2012, WIREs
Cognitive Science, 3, p. 123.
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1.4.1 Boundary Extension as a Source Monitoring Error
When reflecting on memory for the target view during tests of boundary extension,
according to the multisource model, observers must discern from the different sources of their
scene representation (visually perceived information, amodal perception, and elicited conceptual
knowledge) to determine which aspects of the representation originated from visual sensory
input and were seen in the target image (Intraub, 2010, 2012; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008).
Source monitoring errors occur, typically in long-term memory, when the source of a memory is
incorrectly determined based on the memory’s number and quality of perceptual, contextual,
semantic, and emotional details (Johnson et al., 1993). The high level of similarity between an
observer’s memory from visual input for the details at the edge of a picture and their memory
from amodal perception for the continuation of those details leads to source misattribution
(Intraub, 2010, 2012; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008). As a result, information generated from
amodal perception is thought to have come from visual sensory input. Observers, therefore,
believe that they originally saw this information and boundary extension is seen in memory. This
source monitoring error is specifically an error in reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981), as
the observer has failed to determine where externally-generated visual input ended and
internally-generated amodal perception began within their mental representation of the scene
(Intraub, 2010; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008).
Experimental support for this source monitoring hypothesis has come from studies of the
effects that divided attention and varied stimulus duration have on boundary extension. Intraub et
al. (2008) found that divided visual attention (using a visual search task) increased boundary
extension in participants’ boundary ratings, compared to those from participants only engaged in
the memory task. Random error during the search task, however, did not increase for the dual-
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task participants compared to those in the search-only condition, indicating that this increase in
boundary extension was not due to an overall increase in errors as a result of divided attention.
These results have been considered supportive of the multisource model and source monitoring
hypothesis (e.g., Intraub, 2010, 2012) because they suggest that divided attention lowered the
threshold for information generated by amodal perception to be attributed to visual sensory input,
resulting in source attribution error.
Similarly, reduced stimulus duration also increased boundary extension (Intraub et al.,
1996). As previously discussed, stimulus presentation durations of 250 ms and 4 s both resulted
in boundary extension across recall (drawing) and recognition (rating) tasks (Intraub et al.,
1996). Interestingly, however, across both tasks a significant main effect for stimulus duration
was also found, with the shorter duration resulting in an increased degree of boundary extension
compared to the 4 s stimulus duration. Intraub (2010, 2012) has also described this study as
support for the hypothesis that boundary extension is a source monitoring error, because the
reduction in stimulus duration reduces the observer’s memory strength for visual details
originating from visual input. As a result, memory for visual input becomes more similar to
details originating from amodal perception and more vulnerable to source misattribution, as
predicted by source monitoring theory.
2

PRESENT STUDY

While the source monitoring hypothesis seems like a probable explanation of why
boundary extension occurs in human memory for scenes, it is unclear why the shift in the
distinction between perception and memory that is suggested by the multisource model is needed
to explain boundary extension. In the multisource model (Intraub, 2010; Intraub & Dickinson,
2008), representation is equal to perception. Upon seeing a scene, the observer’s internal spatial
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framework (a representation of their understanding of the scene and its likely surrounding spatial
layout) is filled in by visual sensory information, amodal perception, and general conceptual
associations, forming the basis of scene perception. Amodal perception within the representation
results in boundary extension. The traditional visual-cognitive model retains the distinction
between perception and representation that was suggested by Potter (1976), and supported by
others (e.g., Intraub, 1980; Loftus & Ginn, 1984), with representation occurring after perception.
In this model, an observer’s memory for the details of a scene results in a representation based
solely on visual input and separate from the subsequent top-down processing needed for scene
comprehension (amodal perception, conceptual knowledge from categorization and contextual
object associations, etc.) that would be responsible for boundary extension. The difference
between these models lies in the timing of when boundary extension occurs (after the stimulus is
gone according to the traditional model or during perception, as a part of the multisource
representation), as well as by what mechanism boundary extension happens (general top-down
processing in the traditional model or amodal perception, specifically, in the multisource model).
It is possible that either amodal perception or context-based scene interpretations could
result in a continuation of the view beyond its original boundaries, as the result of an error in
source monitoring. Despite Intraub and Dickinson’s attribution of boundary extension to only
amodal perception, they have also repeatedly suggested that scene categorization and the
observer’s contextual knowledge of the scene have similar constraints to amodal perception on
scene representation (e.g., Intraub, 2010, 2012). Unlike Intraub and Dickinson (2008), I do not
find the rapidity of boundary extension as a limitation to the traditional model’s potential to
explain this memory phenomenon. As previously discussed, pictured scenes can be rapidly
categorized within 100 to 150 ms of picture onset (e.g., Davenport & Potter, 2004; Fei-Fei et al.,
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2007; Intraub, 1981; Potter, 1976; Thorpe et al., 1996; Vo͂ & Henderson, 2010). Even the studies
of boundary extension designed to push the limits of stimuli presentation (e.g., 133 ms: Beighley
& Intraub, 2016; 250 ms: Intraub et al., 1996, 2006; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Munger et al.,
2005) have used presentation lengths long enough for scene categorization and similar in length
to a single eye fixation during scene perception (260 to 330 ms; Rayner, 2009; although see
Hale, Brown, & McDunn, 2016, for a demonstration of boundary extension with 46 ms scene
presentation). Conceptual information and contextual associations would, therefore, be available
during a saccade and able to influence an observer’s next view fixation.
While boundary extension has been proven to occur across a variety of testing conditions
and serve an adaptive role in visual scene perception, previous research has not clearly identified
the underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon nor which model offers the best explanation of
this memory error. A comparative approach to studying boundary extension would help identify
the necessary mechanisms and appropriate model of this constructive error in human scene
memory. To test the multisource model, assessments of an observer’s picture memory in the
absence of predictive conceptual knowledge (scene categorization and contextual associations of
objects) of the view are needed to determine the mechanistic role of top-down processing in
scene representation and boundary extension. Assessing scene memory in nonhuman primates
would demonstrate amodal perception and visual sensory input’s effects on boundary extension
in the absence of effects from human conceptual scene knowledge. This dissociation of processes
would be much more difficult to achieve with humans without using purely abstract stimuli or
extremely brief stimuli presentation durations. A comparative approach would allow for the
presentation of pictured scenes in ways similar to that of previous research, affording more direct
comparisons of findings. Studying boundary extension through a comparative lens would
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disentangle the mechanistic roles of these processes in boundary extension, as well as perhaps
point to the model that most accurately explains this memory error.
In addition to minimizing the potential effects of associated conceptual knowledge on
boundary extension, use of the comparative method to study animal visual perception and
cognition provides an informative reference point for human perception. Studying whether
humans and nonhuman animals’ perceptual organization is the same allows for a better
understanding of the evolutionary origins and phylogeny of perception and gives insight into the
fundamental aspects of human perception and mental representation. Comparative psychology
informs theory and evolution (Call, 2017) and plays a crucial role in psychology by connecting
the natural and social sciences within and between disciplines (e.g., psychology and biology;
Call, Burghardt, Pepperberg, Snowdon, & Zentall, 2017). Laboratory studies with nonhuman
animals have better control over a study’s design and stimuli, as well as subjects’ past and future
experience, than do many studies with humans (Call et al., 2017). General life experience and the
specific testing environment can be more easily manipulated as needed to serve research aims in
comparative research. Past comparative analyses have shown that the basic principles of visual
perception are similar across multiple species, including humans (see Lazareva, 2017, for a
review). As discussed earlier, nonhuman primates can also categorize stimuli and form schematic
equivalence classes, recognizing abstract perceptual and functional relations between stimuli (see
Aust, 2017, for a review). These similarities in perception and cognition make nonhuman
primates an ideal model to compare and generalize results to humans.
Through five experiments assessing boundary extension in humans and nonhuman
primates (rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys) I investigated whether boundary extension is
best explained by the traditional visual-cognitive model or the multisource model, while
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revealing what specific psychological processes (e.g., conceptual knowledge, contextual
associations, and amodal perception) lead to boundary extension. In the first comparative study
of boundary extension, identical tasks (for humans and rhesus macaques) and equivalent tasks
(for capuchin monkeys) were given to three species to compare the possibility of boundary
extension occurring. Human adults (Homo sapiens), adult male rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta), and adult male and female capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) completed a
computerized, delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task with various picture stimuli of common
scenes encountered by humans (Pilot study, Replication study, and Experiment 1) or monkeys
(Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B). Building off of previous forced-choice recognition tasks
(Kreindel & Intraub, 2017; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2004; Safer et al., 1998; Spanό et al., 2017),
the objective was to choose which of two simultaneously presented images exactly matched a
previously shown sample image. The target scene was shown alongside either a closer or wider
view of the same image. In the absence of boundary extension, matching responses would not
differ across these conditions. However, if boundary extension had occurred participants would
be more likely to select the wider angle image compared to the closer angle image. This would
result in a decrement in performance when the sample image was the closer view (close trials)
and an aid in performance when the sample image was the wider view (wide trials), an
asymmetrical error pattern indicative of boundary extension.
Consistent with previous research, human participants were expected to demonstrate
boundary extension in a DMTS task with pictures of human-unique scenes. Given the necessity
of schematic and contextual knowledge for boundary extension (e.g., Bertamini et al., 2005;
Mamus & Boduroglu, 2018), it was predicted that monkeys would not show boundary extension
with human-unique scenes but would with monkey-relevant scenes. These results, demonstrating
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that amodal perception alone is not sufficient to produce boundary extension with human-unique
stimuli, would point towards a traditional visual-cognitive model explanation of boundary
extension. This finding would add to the literature that suggests specific conceptual knowledge
of a scene is a necessary mechanism of boundary extension. However, if boundary extension was
not observed at all in the monkeys, such a result would demonstrate the potentially humanunique qualities of boundary extension and a species discontinuity in perceptual experiences.
3

PILOT STUDY WITH ADULT HUMANS

Visual inspection of initial testing (N = 8) with the below procedure, except with a 250
ms sample duration, suggested that this presentation time was too fast for participants to make
meaningful responses (participants answered only 62% of total trials correctly). As a result,
performance with two presentation times (500 and 750 ms) was compared to determine the
appropriate testing parameters for the following experiments.
3.1

Participants
Undergraduate students (N = 23, 22 females, M age = 18.65 years, SD = 1.19) recruited

from the Georgia State University (GSU) psychology research pool participated for course
credit. All participants provided informed consent and all research procedures were approved by
the GSU Institutional Review Board. A total of nine participants were excluded, due to changes
to the testing protocol (stopped using the above described 250 ms sample duration) and because
one participant was not attentive during the task, resulting in a total of 14 participants for
analysis.
3.2

Apparatus
All participants worked on individual 19-inch desktop computers, including individual

headphones. Participants used a standard mouse to respond to stimuli. A total of 90 stimuli
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images were used, including 30 different common human scenes (e.g., backyard, beach, park)
and a closer and wider view of each scene (see Figure 3.1). The different stimuli images were
created using a program written in Visual Basic 6.0, which created a close-up image (showing
13% less of the scene) and a wide-angle image (showing 13% more of the scene) of each of the
30 scenes. The pilot study computer task was also written in Visual Basic 6.0.

Figure 3.1 Example stimuli images of common human scenes.
The wide-angle view (left) and the close-angle view (right) of each scene are also shown.
3.3

Design and Procedure
Participants first saw a start screen with task instructions. These instructions included a

description of the task and directions for responding. To initiate each trial, participants clicked a
“start” button located in the center of the computer screen. This resulted in immediate
presentation of the sample image (400 pixels by 400 pixels) for either 500 or 750 ms, followed
by a black and white mask image for 750 ms. Participants waited through a 2 s delay period
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before seeing two same-size (400 pixels by 400 pixels) images as match options. One of these
images was the sample image, while the foil image was either the zoomed in image of the same
scene (called wide trials, because the sample image was the wider view) or the zoomed out
image of the same scene (called close trials, because the sample image was the more close-up
view). Left-right position of the sample image was randomized across trials. After choosing one
of the match options by clicking on it, participants saw a green checkmark or a red “X” for 2 s in
the bottom right corner of the computer screen, as well as heard either a brief melodic sound or a
buzz tone, after correct or incorrect responses, respectively. Following incorrect responses,
participants also experienced a 10 s timeout. See Figure 3.2 for a visual example of a trial.

Figure 3.2 Example trial of the boundary extension task in the Pilot Study.
Depending on the condition, the sample image was shown for either 500 ms or 750 ms. After a
correct match response, participants saw a green checkmark for 2 s in the bottom right corner of
the computer screen and heard a brief melodic sound. Following incorrect responses,
participants saw a red “X,” heard a brief buzz tone, and experienced a 10 s timeout.
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Participants completed a total of 240 trials, in four 60-trial blocks. Sample duration (500
or 750 ms) alternated by block, counterbalanced across participants. Per block, participants were
presented with each of the 30 sample scenes once, in a random order, before any were repeated,
during which each trial was randomly assigned to be a close or wide trial. For the remaining 30
trials of each block, sample images were presented in random order in the opposite trial type. As
a result, each sample image was presented twice per block, once as a wide trial and once as a
close trial. After testing, all participants were debriefed about the task.
3.4

Results
Participants’ performance was similar with both presentation durations. When the sample

image was presented for 500 ms, participants were correct on 77% of trials (SD = 10.82). When
the sample image was shown for 750 ms, participants were correct on 78% of trials (SD = 14.63).
Performance in both cases was significantly better than chance levels, 500 ms: t(13) = 9.28, p <
.001; 750 ms: t(13) = 7.09, p < .001. There was no significant difference in participants’
performance across conditions, t(13) = -0.30, p = .77.
3.5

Discussion
This pilot study with adult humans was needed to determine the testing parameters for the

following experiments with humans and monkeys. Given that no significant differences in
performance were seen between the two sample presentation durations, the longer sample
presentation (750 ms) was chosen for the following experiments. Choosing the longer of the two
sample durations would afford more time for nonhuman primates to view the sample image in
Experiments 1 and 2, increasing the likelihood that they would be able to learn the DMTS task.
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4

REPLICATION STUDY

Before testing with nonhuman primates, the present method was tested with human adults
to determine whether a computerized DMTS two-alternative forced-choice task was sensitive
enough to detect boundary extension. Considering the results of the pilot study, a 750 ms sample
presentation duration was used.
4.1

Participants
Undergraduate students (N = 63, 59 females, 3 males, 1 participant chose to not provide

their gender, M age = 19.51 years, SD = 2.93) were again recruited from the GSU psychology
research pool and participated for course credit. All participants provided informed consent, and
all research procedures were approved by the GSU Institutional Review Board. One participant
did not complete the entire testing session, leaving a total of 62 participants for analysis.
4.2

Apparatus
The testing setup was the same as in the pilot study.

4.3

Design and Procedure
The task design was the same as in the pilot study, with the only exception being that the

sample image was always presented for 750 ms. Participants completed a total of 180 trials, in
three 60-trial blocks. Per block, participants were again presented with each of the 30 sample
scenes once in a random order before any were repeated. For the first half of each block, each
scene was randomly presented as either a close or wide trial. For the second half of each block,
the sample images were shown again in a different random order, but in the other trial type. After
testing, all participants were debriefed about the task.
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4.4

Results
To test for boundary extension, the error rates in participants’ responding as a function of

trial type and block were examined (see Figure 4.1). Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated a
violation of this assumption for block (χ2(2) = 20.24, p < .001) and the interaction term (χ2(2) =
10.60, p < .01), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser
estimations (block, ε = .78; interaction, ε = .86). There was a significant main effect of trial type,
F(1, 61) = 57.93, p < .001, such that participants produced a significantly higher proportion of
errors on close trials (M = 0.27, SD = 0.11) than on wide trials (M = 0.18, SD = 0.12). Correct
performance patterns in both conditions were significantly above chance levels of responding,
close trials: t(61) = 16.05, p < .001; wide trials: t(61) = 21.37, p < .001. There was also a
significant main effect of block, F(1.56, 94.84) = 110.54, p < .001. Participants’ proportion of
errors significantly decreased across block (block 1, M = 0.31; block 2, M = 0.22; block 3, M =
0.15), with all pairwise comparisons significant after Bonferroni corrections (p < .001). There
was not a significant interaction between block and trial type, F(1.72, 104.99) = 0.97, p = .37.
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Figure 4.1 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for human
adults in the Replication Study.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
4.5

Discussion
The conceptual replication study with human adults using a new version of a DMTS

paradigm replicated boundary extension with a task that could be used with nonhuman primates.
Participants made a significantly higher proportion of errors on close trials than wide trials,
demonstrating the error rate asymmetry indicative of boundary extension. Boundary extension
leads participants to falsely remember the target image with more information just outside of the
scene’s boundaries than was originally presented. When the sample image was the wider view of
the presented scene compared to the foil image participants were more easily able to identify the
correct image, aiding their performance in the task. However, when the sample image was the
closer view it appeared to show less of the original scene, resulting in more errors.
Across blocks, participants’ performance significantly improved but boundary extension
was not eliminated by experience. Feedback resulted in fewer errors as participants advanced
through the task, presumably the result of a practice effect, with the magnitude of boundary
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extension largest for block one, but boundary extension was still observed across all three blocks.
The first block of trials was the most informative for boundary extension, as the sample images
were not yet associated with rewards and penalties as was true in later blocks. This is an
important issue to consider when giving this task to monkeys, as they require multiple sessions to
complete the task. Evidence that feedback did not eliminate boundary extension indicated that
the DMTS task used with human adults would be a suitable method for nonhuman primates.
Overall, this DMTS design, which produces boundary extension in humans even with extended
experience, proved to be a suitable method to study boundary extension in rhesus monkeys and
capuchin monkeys in the following experiments.
5

EXPERIMENT 1

Given the successful replication of boundary extension in human adults, Experiment 1
was conducted to test for boundary extension in nonhuman primates with the same stimuli and
methods as the previous experiment.
5.1

Participants
A total of six adult male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, 13 to 34 years of age) and 23

adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella, 7 males and 16 females, 7 to 48 years of age) housed at
the Georgia State University Language Research Center were tested. All monkeys had constant
visual and auditory access to nearby monkeys during testing, as well as periods without testing
with access to a compatible social partner or group and/or an outdoor play yard multiple times
per week. All of the monkeys voluntarily chose to work for food rewards. Food and water
deprivation were not used. The monkeys were fed a daily diet of primate chow biscuits and
various fruits and vegetables regardless of their performance on the tasks, as well as provided
with continuous access to water. All research procedures followed guidelines for working with
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nonhuman primates and were approved by the GSU Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee. In addition, GSU is accredited by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation
of Laboratory Animal Care.
All of the monkeys were computer and joystick-trained, with extensive experience with a
variety of computerized cognitive tasks, including DMTS tasks. Two capuchin monkeys and two
rhesus macaques were used as pilot animals to determine the training parameters needed for
testing. As a result of working with these animals, testing parameters were modified as needed
for each species to learn the task. All four animals were included in the full testing procedure
described below. After training (described below), nine capuchin monkeys were dropped from
the experiment due to an inability to learn the task, lack of engagement with the task, or time
constraints during testing. This left a total of 14 capuchin monkeys with data for analysis.
5.2

Apparatus
Each monkey was tested individually using the Language Research Center’s

Computerized Test System, which comprises a personal computer, digital joystick, color
monitor, and pellet dispenser (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 2008; Richardson,
Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). The monkeys used their hands to
manipulate the joystick to control a small cursor on the computer screen. Contacting correct
stimuli with the computer cursor resulted in a brief melodic chime and the delivery of a 45-mg
banana-flavored chow pellet, while incorrect responses resulted in a brief buzz tone and a 30 s
timeout period. All tasks were written in Visual Basic 6.0.
Experiment 1 used the same 90 scene stimuli images as the pilot and replication studies
with human adults.
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5.3

Design and Procedure
All monkeys were first trained on the present DMTS task until 75% correct performance

was achieved for three consecutive 60-trial blocks. Monkeys indicated their readiness to work
before each trial by contacting a “start” button through movement of the cursor. For rhesus
monkeys, a training trial included presentation of one of the 90 scene images (selected randomly
and shown as a 400 pixel by 400 pixel image in the center of the computer screen) for 750 ms,
immediately followed by presentation of a black and white mask image for 750 ms, and a 2 s
delay period. After the delay period, two match options (both 400 pixels by 400 pixels) were
presented on the bottom half of the computer screen. One image was the previously seen sample
image, while the foil image was a randomly selected image of a different scene (see Figure 5.1).
Left-right position of the sample image was randomized across trials. After making a matching
response by contacting one of the images with the cursor, monkeys saw either a green checkmark
or a red “X” for 2 s in the bottom right corner of the computer screen, indicating a correct or
incorrect response, respectively. After incorrect responses, monkeys also heard a brief buzz tone
and experienced a 30 s timeout. After correct responses, monkeys heard a brief melodic chime
and received a 45-mg banana-flavored food pellet.
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Figure 5.1 Example training trial of the boundary extension task in Experiment 1.
Specific timing of each component depended on the monkey species being tested. After a correct
match response, monkeys saw a green checkmark for 2 s in the bottom right corner of the
computer screen, heard a brief melodic sound, and received a 45-mg food pellet. Following
incorrect responses, monkeys saw a red “X,” heard a brief buzz tone, and experienced a 30 s
timeout.
For capuchin monkeys, contacting the “start” button resulted in presentation of the
randomly selected sample image (one of the 90 stimuli images, shown as a 400 pixels by 400
pixels image) until the monkey contacted it with the cursor, after which it was displayed for an
additional 1.5 s. A black and white mask image was then displayed for 300 ms, followed by a 2 s
delay period. After this delay, the sample image and an image of a different, randomly-selected
scene were shown simultaneously on the bottom half of the computer screen as match options
(400 pixels by 400 pixels, left-right position randomized across trials). The stimuli remained
onscreen until the monkey contacted one image with the cursor. After correct match responses,
monkeys saw a green checkmark for 2 s in the bottom right corner of the computer screen, heard
a brief melodic chime, and received a 45-mg banana-flavored food pellet. After incorrect
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responses, monkeys instead saw a red “X” for 2 s, heard a brief buzz tone, and were given a 30 s
timeout.
Some capuchin monkeys (N = 6) were unable to pass training with this procedure, so they
were given trials without the 300 ms mask image. All other aspects of the trial were the same.
One capuchin monkey was unable to pass either type of training. As a result, she was given
training trials without a mask image or a delay period. Therefore, after touching the sample
image the match options were immediately presented. After passing this easier version of
training, she was put back on training trials with a 2 s delay period but no mask image until
training criterion was met.
Once each monkey met the training criterion, they were moved to the test phase. Each
trial preceded the same way as described above for the training phase, except that 25% of the
trials were now test trials and 75% of trials were baseline training trials identical to those just
described. During test trials, match options included the sample image, which was always the
central-view of a scene, and a foil image which was either the closer or wider view of that same
scene (as shown in Figure 3.2). The test trials were intermixed among training trials and each of
the 30 sample scenes were presented twice as close and wide trials before being repeated. For
capuchin monkeys given training trials without mask images, test trials were also presented
without a mask image. All monkeys worked until they completed at least 2,400 total trials in the
test phase.
5.4

Results

5.4.1 Rhesus macaques
By random chance, two blocks did not include all three conditions (train, close, and wide
trials). Instead of excluding those blocks from analysis, each rhesus monkey’s performance was
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binned into 20 120-trial blocks for analysis. Analysis of the monkeys’ average proportion of
errors, as a function of trial type and block, indicated a significant main effect of trial type, F(2,
10) = 183.58, p < .001 (see Figure 5.2). Performance was above chance levels for all trial types,
train: t(5) = 17.55, p < .001; close: t(5) = 2.81, p < .05; wide: t(5) = 2.69, p < .05. Pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons showed that rhesus monkeys
made a significantly smaller proportion of errors on train trials (M = 0.11, SD = 0.06) compared
to close trials (M = 0.45, SD = 0.04), p < .001, and wide trials (M = 0.45, SD = 0.04), p < .001,
but that the proportion of errors made on close and wide trials were not significantly different
from each other, p = 1.00. There was no main effect of block, F(19, 95) = 0.62, p = .88, or an
interaction between block and trial type, F(38, 190) = 0.43, p = .17. Analysis of performance on
critical trials during the first block also showed no difference in the rhesus monkeys’ proportion
of errors on close (M = 0.47, SD = 0.19) and wide (M = 0.50, SD = 0.24) trials, t(5) = -0.27, p =
.80.

Figure 5.2 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for rhesus
macaques in Experiment 1.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
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5.4.2 Capuchin monkeys
Capuchin monkeys’ proportion of errors were analyzed across 40 60-trial blocks, as a
function of trial type and block (see Figure 5.3). Overall, capuchins performed above chance in
all trial types, train: t(13) = 19.80, p < .001; close: t(13) = 4.11, p = .001; wide: t(13) = 3.91, p <
.01. There was a significant main effect of trial type, F(2, 26) = 258.92, p < .001. Pairwise
comparisons, with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons, showed that monkeys made
a significantly smaller proportion of errors on train trials (M = 0.20, SD = 0.06) than on close (M
= 0.47, SD = 0.03), p < .001, and wide trials (M = 0.47, SD = 0.03), p < .001. Performance on
close and wide trials did not differ from each other, p = 1.00. There was no main effect of block,
F(39, 507) = 0.90, p = .65, or an interaction between block and trial type, F(78, 1014) = 1.03, p =
.40. The monkeys’ performance on the critical close and wide trials during the first block showed
a significant difference as a function of trial type, t(13) = -2.72, p < .05. Capuchin monkeys
made a larger proportion of errors on wide trials (M = 0.62, SD = 0.16) than on close trials (M =
0.47, SD = 0.14)
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Figure 5.3 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for capuchin
monkeys in Experiment 1.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
5.5

Discussion
The multisource model predicts that either amodal perception or conceptual knowledge

can result in boundary extension. However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest the contrary.
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys did not show boundary extension when viewing scenes
commonly encountered by humans but not nonhuman primates. Under these conditions,
conceptual knowledge for categorization of the scene and contextual associations from objects
were absent for the animals. However, based on research with fish (Sovrano & Bisazza, 2008),
chicks (Regolin & Vallortigara, 1995), mice (Kanizsa, Renzi, Conte, Compostela, & Guerani,
1993), baboons (Deruelle, Barbet, Dépy, & Fagot, 2000; Fagot, Barbet, Parron, & Deruelle,
2006), rhesus monkeys (Fujita, 2001), and chimpanzees (Sato, Kanazawa, & Fujita, 1997)
indicating that amodal completion is present in animal visual perception, it can be assumed that
amodal perception would have been experienced by the monkeys.
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The absence of boundary extension in the present experiment suggests that amodal
perception may not be sufficient for boundary extension to occur in memory. Instead, object and
conceptual knowledge of a scene may be a necessary mechanism of boundary extension.
However, there is evidence that amodal perception is sufficient for boundary extension when
abstract geometric shapes are the stimuli (see Hale, Brown, McDunn, & Siddiqui, 2015;
McDunn, Siddiqui, & Brown, 2014). This would suggest that the failure of monkeys to show
boundary extension in the present experiment is more likely a species difference, rather than the
result of amodal perception not being sufficient to elicit boundary extension. However, it is
important to withhold that conclusion until monkeys could be presented with relevant stimuli
that would prompt conceptual knowledge, to see if this might induce boundary extension. By
using scenes that are familiar to the monkeys, instead of human scenes that they have no
knowledge of, the necessity of conceptual knowledge can be assessed, at least to the best extent
possible with a nonverbal species. This hypothesis was tested further in the following
experiments.
Unlike for human adults, the monkeys’ performance did not benefit from experience.
Error rates did not significantly improve or differ in any way for either species across 40 blocks
of 60 trials. Capuchin monkeys did demonstrate a difference in performance on the critical test
trials during the first block of Experiment 1. However, this outcome was unexpected, as it was in
the opposite direction of boundary extension. Capuchin monkeys made fewer errors on close
trials than wide trials. This result may have been because the monkeys were paying more
attention to central features of the scene, as opposed to the overall scene. These central features
would have been slightly more prominent in the closer view of the sample images, resulting in a
bias for this view when making match responses during the task.
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6

EXPERIMENT 2A

Given the absence of boundary extension in two species of nonhuman primates using
images of human scenes, Experiment 2A was conducted to test for boundary extension with
monkey-relevant stimuli. Showing the monkeys pictures of common human scenes (e.g., a
restaurant) would not have activated any schemas in the animals, because they would not
recognize what the image was a picture of. The rationale of the present experiment was that
perhaps images of scenes that the monkeys would be familiar with would be more likely to
induce boundary extension if this memory error requires conceptual knowledge and contextual
associations evoked by the objects in the scene. This experiment was more species-fair if scene
relevance matters for boundary extension, and I therefore was better able to investigate whether
conceptual knowledge of familiar scenes was needed for boundary extension to occur.
6.1

Participants
The same six rhesus macaques and 14 capuchin monkeys that passed training in

Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2A.
6.2

Apparatus
The testing apparatus and computer task were the same as in Experiment 1. Experiment

2A used 90 images of common scenes encountered by the monkeys as stimuli. These images
included 30 different scenes of the monkeys’ inside and outside environments at the Language
Research Center (e.g., play yards, inside home enclosures), as well as a closer and wider view of
each scene (see Figure 6.1). The stimuli images were created using the same program previously
described to create the stimuli images of human scenes and were cropped using the same
dimensions.
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Figure 6.1 Example stimuli images of common scenes encountered by the monkeys.
The wide-angle view (left) and the close-angle view (right) of each scene are also shown.
6.3

Design and Procedure
Due to a break in testing between experiments 1 and 2A, three rhesus macaques were re-

trained on the boundary extension task using Experiment 1 training procedures and stimuli. All
other monkeys moved directly from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2A without completing any
additional training and without any substantial delay between test periods. Trials proceeded
exactly as described in Experiment 1 for each species, with test trials occurring 25% of the time.
Due to experimenter error, all capuchin monkeys were given trials with black and white visual
masks, regardless of their training history with or without masks in Experiment 1. All monkeys
worked until they completed at least 2,400 total trials.
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6.4

Results

6.4.1 Rhesus macaques
Rhesus macaques’ performance was divided into 40 60-trial blocks for analysis as a
function of trial type and block (see Figure 6.2). Performance was above chance for all trial
types, train: t(5) = 5.95, p < .01; close: t(5) = 4.13, p < .01; wide: t(5) = 4.93, p < .01. The
monkeys’ error rates showed a significant main effect of trial type, F(2, 10) = 22.08, p < .001.
Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) indicated that monkeys
made a significantly smaller proportion of errors on train trials (M = 0.24, SD = 0.11) compared
to close trials (M = 0.45, SD = 0.03), p < .01, and wide trials (M = 0.45, SD = 0.02), p < .05.
Performance on close and wide trials did not differ from each other, p = 1.00. There was no main
effect of block, F(39, 195) = 1.00, p = .47, or an interaction, F(78, 390) = 0.98, p = .54. Analysis
of performance during the first block of testing also did not show any significant differences
between close (M = 0.44, SD = 0.31) and wide (M = 0.38, SD = 0.13) trials, t(5) = 0.57, p = .59.
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Figure 6.2 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for rhesus
macaques in Experiment 2A.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
6.4.2 Capuchin monkeys
Capuchin monkeys’ performance was analyzed across 40 60-trial blocks, as a function of
trial type and block (see Figure 6.3). Across all trial types, monkeys performed significantly
above chance levels, train: t(13) = 14.58, p < .001; close: t(13) = 2.92, p = .01; wide: t(13) =
4.23, p = .001. There was a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 26) = 123.66, p < .001, such
that monkeys made a significantly smaller proportion of errors on train trials (M = 0.23, SD =
0.07) than on close (M = 0.46, SD = 0.05) and wide (M = 0.46, SD = 0.03) trials, all pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections p < .001. Performance on close and wide trials did not
differ from each other, p = 1.00. There was no effect of block, F(39, 507) = 1.01, p = .46, or an
interaction, F(78, 1014) = 1.02, p = .43. Monkeys’ performance on close (M = 0.47, SD = 0.21)
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and wide (M = 0.44, SD = 0.23) trials during the first block also did not show any significant
differences in error rates, t(13) = 0.42, p = .68.

Figure 6.3 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for capuchin
monkeys in Experiment 2A.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
6.5

Discussion
Using images of relevant scenes for these monkeys (i.e., common scenes encountered by

these specific animals) also did not lead to boundary extension. Neither species demonstrated a
difference in performance on close and wide trials. This is contrary to predictions from both
models of scene perception. Presumably, relevant scenes would have engaged the mental
activities proposed by the traditional and multisource models to be present during scene
perception (visual input, amodal perception, and schematic information of the scene). Despite the
presence of an additional source of information compared to the previous experiment (i.e.,
categorization of the scene from conceptual knowledge and contextual associations), it seems
that the monkeys were only relying on direct visual input during the DMTS task. This resulted in
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an identical outcome as the previous experiment, with above chance performance when
identifying the sample image from a foil image but no difference in performance based on the
sample image’s view relative to the foil image. This lack of boundary extension in rhesus
monkeys and capuchin monkeys may represent a potential species difference between human
and nonhuman primates for this memory error.
However, an additional explanation is that the monkeys were not motivated to perform
well on critical trials compared to baseline trials given the much greater difficulty of those trials
and the 50% chance level on what amounted to be a minority of the overall trials presented. This
lack of motivation to attend carefully on these trials could have led to equal performance on
close and wide trials. This possibility was investigated further in the following experiment by
increasing the frequency of test trials experienced by the monkeys, so that they would have to try
harder to perform well on those trials to keep the rate of reward that they had become
accustomed to consistent.
7

EXPERIMENT 2B

Although all monkeys’ performance in Experiments 1 and 2A were significantly above
chance levels for all conditions, performance on the critical test trials did not differ greatly from
chance unlike the baseline training trials. In Experiment 1, rhesus macaques’ proportion of errors
on training trials (M = 0.11) was much lower than their proportion of errors on close (M = 0.45)
and wide trials (M = 0.45). The same pattern was observed for rhesus macaques in Experiment
2A: training trials (M = 0.24), close trials (M = 0.45), and wide trials (M = 0.45). Capuchin
monkeys demonstrated the same trend in performance for Experiment 1 (train trials, M = 0.20;
close trials, M = 0.47; wide trials, M = 0.47) and Experiment 2A (train trials, M = 0.23; close
trials, M = 0.46; wide trials, M = 0.46). It was possible that the monkeys were not motivated to
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do well on the critical test trials due to their infrequent occurrence (25% of the total trials),
especially given the high levels of reward they received on baseline training trials.
Experiment 2B was done to increase monkeys’ motivation to respond meaningfully on
test trials by increasing the probability of close and wide trials occurring to 75%. To determine
whether this made a difference in eliciting boundary extension, I tested macaques first to see
whether additional tests with capuchin monkeys might be warranted by this manipulation.
7.1

Participants
The same six rhesus macaques from the previous experiments participated.

7.2

Apparatus
The testing apparatus was the same as in previous experiments with the monkeys. The

computer task and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2A.
7.3

Design and Procedure
Experiment 2B used the same testing procedures as Experiment 2A, with one critical

difference. Test trials now occurred 75% of the time during testing and baseline training trials
occurred 25% of the time. No additional training was completed between this and the previous
experiment. Halfway through testing, a procedure modification was made for one animal for
husbandry reasons. Instead of being rewarded with one 45-mg food pellet for correct responses,
he was rewarded with two 45-mg food pellets. All other procedures remained the same. Monkeys
worked until they completed at least 1,200 total trials.
7.4

Results
Rhesus macaques’ performance was analyzed across 20 60-trial blocks, as a function of

trial type and block (see Figure 7.1). Fewer blocks were analyzed due to the higher percentage of
test trials compared to previous experiments. Performance for all trial types was significantly
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above chance levels, train: t(5) = 6.32, p = .001; close: t(5) = 3.54, p < .05; wide: t(5) = 3.00, p <
.05. There was a significant main effect of trial type, F(2, 10) = 27.87, p < .001. Pairwise
comparisons, corrected for multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni correction, indicated that
monkeys made a significantly smaller proportion of errors on train trials (M = 0.22, SD = 0.11)
than on close (M = 0.46, SD = 0.03), p = .007, and wide (M = 0.46, SD = 0.04) trials, p = .01.
Performance on the critical close and wide trials did not differ from each other, p = 1.00. There
was not a main effect of block, F(19, 95) = 0.85, p = .64, or a significant interaction, F(38, 190)
= 0.974, p = .52. Performance during the first block of testing was not analyzed given that the
stimuli and task design were no longer novel to the monkeys.

Figure 7.1 Mean proportion of errors, as a function of trial type and block, for rhesus
macaques in Experiment 2B.
Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals.
7.5

Discussion
As in Experiment 2A, rhesus macaques did not demonstrate boundary extension or an

effect of experience. Increasing the frequency of test trials to motivate the monkeys to perform
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meaningfully on the critical close and wide trials did not elicit boundary extension. Rhesus
monkeys’ performance on the test trials did not differ, nor did their performance change across
blocks. Monkeys performance on all trial types only differed slightly from previous experiments,
suggesting that the monkeys were at their threshold of discriminative ability. Even when
demonstrating their best performance, the monkeys were not affected by the scene’s view
relative to a foil image. Unlike humans, they did not misremember a sample image with a closer
or wider view than was originally seen. Instead, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys seemed
to be “invulnerable” to boundary extension.
8

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Boundary extension, a memory error in which participants remember seeing details of a
pictured scene that were not shown (e.g., Intraub & Richardson, 1989), has been observed in a
variety of testing conditions in humans. To determine the underlying mechanisms of this
phenomenon and whether it is better explained by the traditional visual-cognitive (Baddeley &
Hitch, 1974; Irwin, 1991, 1993; Phillips, 1974; Potter, 1976; Sperling, 1960) or the multisource
model (Intraub, 2010; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008), a series of experiments were conducted with
humans and nonhuman primates (rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys) assessing boundary
extension across species.
Consistent with previous research, human participants demonstrated boundary extension
across three blocks of trials in a DMTS task with pictures of common scenes encountered by
humans (e.g., beach, playground, backyard; Replication Study). These results provided a
conceptual replication of boundary extension in human adults with a comparative method that
could be given to nonhuman primates. When the same human-unique scenes and DMTS task
were presented to the monkeys neither species demonstrated boundary extension in the absence
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of conceptual knowledge and contextual associations (Experiment 1). Performance was above
chance level in all conditions (baseline, close, and wide trials), indicating that the animals were
able to remember and successfully discriminate between the sample image and a foil image.
However, the error asymmetry between close and wide trials indicative of boundary extension
was not observed. Images of monkey-relevant scenes (e.g., play yards, inside housing
enclosures) also did not lead to boundary extension in rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys
(Experiment 2A), even when the occurrence of test trials was increased to motivate the monkeys
to perform well (Experiment 2B). Again, performance was above chance levels in all conditions
for both experiments.
The magnitude of boundary extension can differ depending on the conditions under
which it is studied (e.g., Beighley & Intraub, 2016; Hale et al., 2016; Intraub et al., 1996, 2008).
Interestingly, the monkeys’ performance was not impacted by the type of stimuli (relevant and
non-relevant scenes) they were exposed to. There were no noticeable differences in the
magnitude of the monkeys’ error rates across Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B for either species. At
their threshold of discrimination (error proportions ranged between 0.45 and 0.47 across
experiments and species), monkeys were equally as good at discriminating the sample from
closer and wider views of the same image. These results were seen even though the test trials
were difficult trials that might have lended themselves to a bias on the basis of the match
option’s view angle (i.e., being the closer or wider view). No separation in performance (e.g.,
above and below chance level) for the critical test trials reflects no presence of boundary
extension in a test in which humans did show a difference.
Unlike most studies of boundary extension, the present study also explored the effects of
experience. Overall, monkeys did not show any differences in performance across blocks, except
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capuchin monkeys who showed a significant difference in performance on close and wide trials
during the first block of Experiment 1. However, this difference was in the opposite direction of
the boundary extension effect, with the monkeys performing better on close trials (when the
sample image was the closer view compared to the foil image) compared to wide trials (when the
sample image was the wider view compared to the foil image), and the effect did not replicate in
Experiment 2A with new stimuli. For humans, experience reduced the effect of boundary
extension, but did not eliminate it. This again provides a strong contrast in performance among
species, with humans showing a clear replication of the effect and monkeys instead showing
limited or no evidence.
The present study demonstrated a thorough investigation of boundary extension in
nonhuman primates. Monkeys’ high performance on baseline training trials (which ranged from
76% to 89% correct, across species and experiments) clearly indicates that the monkeys were
engaged and making meaningful responses throughout the DMTS task. Presenting the same
stimuli to human adults, rhesus monkeys, and capuchin monkeys allowed for a direct comparison
of recognition memory and possible boundary extension effects. The present study also included
a species-fair investigation of boundary extension by exposing the monkeys to multiple pictures
of scenes relevant to them. Seeing different pictures of outside play yards, for example, should
have evoked the schema for “play yards” in the monkeys, just as seeing pictures of restaurants
evokes schematic information (i.e., conceptual knowledge and contextual object associations) in
human adults. Despite these manipulations, monkeys do not seem biased to interpret a widerangle view as being more similar to the sample image, while humans are biased in this way.
While these null results do not provide evidence for the traditional visual-cognitive model
or the multisource model of scene perception, they do suggest a possible species difference in
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perception. Both models predict that amodal perception and conceptual knowledge of a scene
would lead to boundary extension. The traditional model suggests that boundary extension would
not occur in the absence of conceptual knowledge, while the multisource model predicts that
boundary extension would occur both with and without conceptual knowledge due to amodal
perception. Even though the mechanisms of boundary extension in human memory are still
unclear, the present study suggests that capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques are immune to
this memory error, or at least that the present approach, which elicits boundary extension in
humans, does not elicit this memory error in monkeys. The absence of boundary extension
without conceptual knowledge (Experiment 1) and with conceptual knowledge (Experiment 2A
and 2B) demonstrates that monkeys can rely on visual input alone to discriminate scenic stimuli,
even in the presence of amodal perception, conceptual categorization, and contextual
associations of the scene.
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys are primarily local processers (De Lillo,
Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi,
2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003), unlike humans who show more frequent global-tolocal precedence when assessing compound stimuli (e.g., Navon, 1977, 1981). This difference
may have limited the monkeys’ representation of the broader scene, making them unsusceptible
to boundary extension effects. As local processors, the monkeys’ ability to focus primarily on
individual items of the scene through bottom-up processing (potentially resulting in a mental
representation that was a collection of items, instead of a continuous scene) may have protected
them from the interfering effects of conceptual knowledge and contextual associations from topdown processing. In contrast, due to the precedence for global processing, humans may not have
been as easily able to overcome the interfering information from top-down processing during
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scene perception, resulting in boundary extension in memory. This would be consistent with
research demonstrating that boundary extension only occurs for views of scenes and does not
occur for non-scenes (e.g., Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 1998; Legault & Standing,
1992; Park, Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007). Such a result demonstrates a sharp species
discontinuity and may reflect a truly human-unique perceptual experience for boundary
extension. However, future research with more species would be required to provide stronger
support for such a contention.
8.1

Implications
The present study highlights the processes necessary for scene perception. For boundary

extension to occur a scene must be processed in its entirety and as a continuous view. This
memory error was not seen in the monkeys perhaps because of their precedence for local features
when viewing complex stimuli, limiting their interpretation of the sample images as scenes. It is
humans’ global-to-local processing of visual stimuli that allows for boundary extension to occur.
This sharp contrast between humans and two species of nonhuman primates highlights the
uniqueness of boundary extension in the human experience and the necessary role global
processing plays in scene perception.
While no strong conclusions can be made about which of the former models best explains
boundary extension based on the present comparative data, monkeys’ ability to rely on visual
input alone demonstrates that local processing can be protective against this memory error.
While boundary extension plays an important role in scene perception by priming the next
fixation, at times this memory error could be maladaptive. When accurate memory of a scene is
essential, the present study suggests that local processing of the scene’s features would lead to
more accurate recall and recognition of that scene. Therefore, the present study’s results suggest
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that intentional local processing of scenes can be used to circumvent boundary extension when
necessary.
8.2

Limitations
An unavoidable limitation of the present study is the assumption that the nonhuman

primates interpreted the sample images as referents to real-world scenes. Several species of great
apes, as well as capuchin monkeys, have been shown to be capable of referential understanding
that can guide behavior in the real-world (e.g., Gardner, Gardner, & Van Cantfort, 1989; Itakura,
1994; Kuhlmeier & Boysen, 2001, 2002; Kuhlmeier, Boysen, & Mukobi, 1999; Menzel,
Premack, & Woodruff, 1978; Poss & Rochat, 2003; Potì & Saporiti, 2010; Savage-Rumbaugh,
McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins, & Rupert, 1986; Truppa, Spinozzi, Stegagno, & Fagot, 2009).
These studies are encouraging results that the rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys interpreted
the human-unique and monkey-relevant stimuli as images of the real-world, invoking top-down
processes (conceptual and contextual associations) during perception. However, in several of the
previous studies training was involved to teach the animals to learn the referential associations,
so this assumption remains a concern for the present study.
Additionally, many of the monkeys advanced through the present study’s experiments
with different levels of experience. That is, while all monkeys completed at least 2,400 trials in
Experiments 1 and 2A and 1,200 trials in Experiment 2B, some monkeys completed many more
trials than that before moving on to the next experiment, while others did not (see Table 8.1 for
the total number of trials completed by each monkey for each experiment). These differing
numbers of trials determined each monkeys’ experience and familiarity with the task as they
advanced through the present study. However, the lack of a main effect for block in Experiments
1, 2A, and 2B make it less likely that these differences in experience affected the results.
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Table 8.1 Total Number of Trials Completed by Each Monkey
Exp 1*
Exp 2A*

Exp 2B**

Capuchin Monkeys
Benny

3,539

3,509

-

Gonzo

2,663

4,262

-

Gretel

4,401

6,561

-

Griffin

5,750

4,632

-

Ira

2,845

2,976

-

Ivory

6,040

3,348

-

Lexi

2,696

4,525

-

Lily

5,844

2,462

-

Logan

2,760

13,373

-

Nala

6,049

2,413

-

Nkima

4,067

4,085

-

Paddy

4,764

3,450

-

Widget

2,608

3,092

-

Wren

3,342

6,100

-

Chewie

3,845

6,044

2,923

Hank

3,341

2,639

1,733

Lou

3,007

4,246

3,302

Luke

3,916

6,152

1,417

Murphy

2,437

2,458

1,994

Obi

5,385

3,133

2,563

Rhesus Monkeys

Note. *Only the first 2,400 trials were analyzed **Only the first 1,200 trials were analyzed
8.3

Future Directions
One species that would be of interest to test for the presence of boundary extension

would be pigeons (Columba livia). Pigeons are known to have visual systems with functionally
equivalent properties to humans (Levenson, Krupinski, Navarro, & Wasserman, 2015) and, like
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monkeys, are also local visual processors (e.g., Cerella, 1980). Additionally, like human and
nonhuman primates, pigeons can learn to recognize and categorize objects into common and
abstract categories using similar mechanisms (e.g., Bhatt, Wasserman, Reynolds, & Knauss,
1988; see Soto & Wasserman, 2014, for a review). For example, Bhatt et al. (1988) trained
pigeons to classify images into four categories (cats, flowers, cars, and chairs). The pigeons were
able to then generalize from exemplar images for each category and accurately categorize novel
stimuli. Other pigeons were able to correctly classify stimuli in the absence of any exemplars.
Given pigeons’ ability to discriminate complex visual stimuli (e.g., color paintings by Monet and
Picasso, Watanabe, Sakamoto, & Wakita, 1995; benign and malignant human breast tissue and
cancer microcalcifications, Levenson et al., 2015) and presumably form concepts in order to
categorize novel stimuli, they may offer interesting results in a study of boundary extension.
While there are similarities in pigeons’ ability to visually discriminate stimuli, there are
also differences between primate and pigeon learning. In a study of rule-based (RB) and
information-integration (II) categorization, Smith et al. (2012a) found that humans, rhesus
macaques, and capuchin monkeys learn a RB task quicker and more accurately than an II task.
Pigeons, on the other hand, learned RR and II tasks with equal speed and performance. Given the
high perceptual acuity of pigeons and the differences in learning, I would predict that they would
not demonstrate boundary extension in memory. Most likely, discrimination of the sample image
from a foil image would be even better than that by the rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys,
with no effect of trial type on proportions of errors. If so, further evidence would be provided
that boundary extension may be a human-unique experience.
Another study of interest would be a local-global training study with nonhuman primates.
If the reason rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys did not demonstrate boundary extension is
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because they are local processors, it would be expected that training them to allocate their
attention to global features of a visual stimulus would lead to boundary extension during a
subsequent test of scene recognition. Monkeys would have to be trained to be global processers,
as well as demonstrate transference of this skill to novel complex stimuli, including images of
scenes. Once monkeys can process stimuli with a global precedence, a test of boundary extension
with the same DMTS task used in the present study might demonstrate boundary extension in the
monkeys’ performance. This would further demonstrate that local processing by the monkeys
was the reason for the present study’s results.
Overall, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys do not seem to demonstrate boundary
extension on a test for which humans clearly did demonstrate this memory error. This species
discontinuity may be due to the difference in visual attention allocation between humans and two
species of nonhuman animals, elucidating an important mechanism of scene perception and a
potential means to prevent boundary extension from occurring in memory. Future studies with
other species of nonhuman animals would further explain the mechanisms involved in boundary
extension and the cognitive model that best describes this memory error.
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